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STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
 My interest in securitization dates from almost the inception of this field.  As 
a lawyer in the 1980s and ‘90s, I helped pioneer the development of securitization 
as a discipline by structuring, negotiating, and drafting hundreds of transactions 
involving mortgage loans and other financial assets and also by writing much of 
the seminal legal scholarship.  And as a teacher in the 1980s, I created what I 
believe to have been the first law school courses on securitization. 
As the subject has developed, I have continued to teach securitization and 
structured finance at the law schools of Yale, Columbia, and now Duke, and have 
lectured on the subject at Oxford University and other top universities throughout 
the world.  I have authored two textbooks regarding securitization: STRUCTURED 
FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (PLI 3d ed.), and  
SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS (LexisNexis 
2004).  My research and writing on the topic also include numerous articles 
published in many of the nation’s leading law reviews.  Exhibit 2 includes a 
complete list of my relevant publications. 
This expertise and experience have enabled me to advise many public and 
private institutions regarding securitization specifically and the regulation and 
reform of capital markets generally.  For example, I have testified on these topics 
before the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, committees of the U.S. 
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House and Senate, and numerous courts in the United States and abroad.  I have 
also advised organizations such as the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, the U.S. State Department, several U.S. Federal Reserve  
banks, the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the American Bar Association 
Section on Business Law, agencies of the governments of Canada, Chile, and 
Korea, and the chairman and secretariat of the U.K. Independent Commission on 
Banking. 
This case has enormous implications for the securitization industry.  By 
1992, securitization had become so important to the American economy that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission observed that it was “becoming one of the 
dominant means of capital formation in the United States.”1 Although highly 
leveraged collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions unfairly gave 
securitization bad press during the recent financial crisis,
2
 securitization 
transactions are beneficial and remain critical to the economy.  Even during the 
financial crisis, the federal government initiated a $200 billion Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility (known as “TALF”) in order to keep the securitization 
                                           
1 Investment Company Act, Release No. 19105, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 
85,062, at 83,500 (Nov. 19, 1992) (provided in connection with the issuance of Rule 3a-7 under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940).  
2 See, e.g.,  Steven L. Schwarcz, What is Securitization? And for What Purpose?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1283, 1285 (2012) (explaining why highly leveraged CDO transactions were different than 
securitization). 
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markets running, thereby assuring “the availability of credit to households and 
businesses of all sizes.”
3
  
Given my experience in the securitization field, and my interest in its 
continued viability, I am participating as amicus curiae to illuminate the structure, 
intent, and broader market context of the transaction at issue.  Securitization deals 
can be complex, and—as in this litigation—are frequently mischaracterized.  Thus 
this brief seeks to ensure that the transactional contracts are interpreted and 
regulated in a sensible way that reflects their underlying logic and intent.  
Although my work in preparing this brief has been reimbursed at my usual rate by 
WMC Mortgage, LLC, the opinions and conclusions expressed in this brief 
represent my own independent, consistent, and strongly held views.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Plaintiff, suing on behalf of investors, contends that “commercial reality” 
dictates that its claims are not time-barred.  Plaintiff-Appellant Reply Br. 14.  The 
“context,” Plaintiff maintains, makes clear that investors bargained for, and the 
seller agreed to, a limitations period that would not end, for any defective loan, 
until six years after a demand for cure or repurchase of that loan.  Id. at 2. 
                                           
3 See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: 
Frequently Asked Questions (July 21, 2010) (available at http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/talf_faq.html). 
Federal Reserve Board, Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), Terms and Conditions 
 
(available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/monetary20081125a1.pdf). 
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 This position contradicts the practice and organization of the securitization 
market Plaintiff purports to describe.  That market does not, and would not, 
tolerate a limitations period that is effectively limitless.  Because Plaintiff’s theory 
assigns to itself sole control of the timing of the repurchase demand, Plaintiff 
would determine the start—and therefore the end—of the period in which it could 
sue.  Such unbounded liability is at odds with the law and practice of securitization 
in at least three important respects.   
First, Plaintiff treats the seller of the securitized loans as an ongoing 
guarantor throughout the life of those loans.  This ignores the essence of 
securitization, which is to transfer risk from companies making and selling loans, 
on the one hand, to investors in securities based on those loan repayments, on the 
other.  Securitization involves bundling together many loans, transferring them 
ultimately to a trust, and selling securities entitling investors to a portion of future 
loan repayments.  An investor who buys the securities takes on the future risks 
associated with the loans in the trust.  When the sale of loans occurs, the role of the 
seller (such as Defendant-DBSP) effectively ends.  That is why an investor’s rights 
against the seller are limited to breaches by the seller of representations and 
warranties as to the quality of the loans at the time of their sale, and why the 
limitations period must run from that point.  Other participants in the securitization 
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process—but not the seller—play an ongoing role after that sale, the whole point of 
which is to transfer future risk on the loans from the seller to the investors.   
Second, Plaintiff insists that, but for the lifelong assurances it perceives in 
this deal’s repurchase provision, mortgage-backed securities would have been too 
risky to market.  “[T]here would have been no investors” in mortgage-backed 
securities, Plaintiff maintains, because “investors simply could not have taken on 
the risk.”4  Plaintiff-Appellant Brief at 27, 2.  The length of time to demand 
repurchase of a loan in breach, however, was not remotely as important as Plaintiff 
makes it out to be; at the time, investors were eager to invest in these types of 
securities, and did so based principally on the securities’ credit rating and interest 
rate—not the statute of limitations.5   
Third, Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that six years following the loan sale is too 
short a period within which to detect a representation-and-warranty breach and 
demand repurchase.  This is belied by reality: The vast scope of pending RMBS 
litigation, most of which was filed within six years of the loans’ sale, illustrates 
that this is not an unfairly compressed period in which to sue.  And as a logical 
matter, the only type of breach that triggered a repurchase obligation was a breach 
                                           
4 See also Plaintiff-Appellant Brief 10 (“[I]nvestors simply could not agree to purchase certificates 
without receiving some assurance that [the seller], not the investors, would bear the risk [of false 
representative and warranties] for the life of the Trust”).  
5 Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. 
L. REV. 549, 563 (2009) (discussing investor overreliance on credit ratings). 
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of a representation and warranty of a loan’s quality at the time of its sale.  If a loan 
becomes delinquent or defaulted within a few years of the sale, that suggests there 
might have been such a representation-and-warranty breach.  If, however, the loan 
is timely repaid for several years, any subsequent default almost certainly would be 
caused by a change in the borrower’s circumstances.  Plaintiffs also decry the 
burden and expense of reevaluating (or “re-underwriting”) all loans.  But that’s a 
red herring: re-underwriting all of the loans would never be the only or most 
efficient way to detect possible breaches.   
These and other mistakes reveal Plaintiff’s fundamental misunderstanding of 
the mortgage-backed securities market.  Nothing in the contract at issue, or its 
commercial context, indicates an intent to depart from New York’s  familiar 
default rule of contract law.  A judicial decision embracing that misunderstanding 
would introduce dangerous uncertainty into the contract law that has made New 
York the world’s jurisdiction of choice for capital-markets transactions.  The Court 
should reject Plaintiffs’ mistaken characterizations of the securitization process and 
affirm the decision below. 
BACKGROUND 
 “Securitization” refers to transactions in which investors buy securities 
issued by a special-purpose entity, such as a trust, which uses the proceeds to 
purchase income-producing assets such as accounts receivable, lease rentals, or, 
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most commonly, residential mortgage loans.  Collections on the income-producing 
assets constitute the primary source of repayment of those securities.
6
  The 
securitization process for residential mortgage loans, somewhat simplified as 
described here, involves several steps and parties:   
• An originator (a bank or other lender) makes mortgage loans.  The decision 
to lend and the terms of repayment are generally based on an evaluation of 
the borrower’s (i.e., homeowner’s) assets, liabilities, income, and overall 
creditworthiness, as well as the relationship between the appraised value of 
the mortgaged home (the collateral for the loan) and the principal of the loan 
(typically known as the loan-to-value ratio).   
• A seller, which may be the originator or a third-party sponsor that buys 
loans from originators, pools together many loans for a given securitization 
transaction.  This statistically spreads the risk of individual loan defaults and 
also justifies the transaction costs.  In this case, Defendant-DBSP acted as 
the seller. 
• A depositor, which is a “bankruptcy remote” special-purpose vehicle, 
purchases the pool of loans from the seller.  The sale is governed by a 
contract customarily known as a mortgage loan purchase agreement, or 
MLPA.  The MLPA is usually intended to create a true sale for bankruptcy 
purposes. 
• A trust, which is another type of special-purpose vehicle, pays the depositor 
to transfer the pool of loans into the trust.  The trust exists to hold title to the 
loans.    The trust raises money to make that payment by issuing securities to 
investors. 
• The securities issued by the trust give investors the right to repayment from 
(a) the principal and interest payments made by borrowers on the loans held 
in the trust and (b) if a borrower defaults, foreclosure and other remedies 
against the collateral (i.e., the mortgaged home).  The securities and the trust 
itself are governed by a pooling and servicing agreement, or PSA.  This 
                                           
6 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, What is Securitization? And for What Purpose?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1283, 1298 (2012). 
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defines the terms of the securities, which vary within a given securitization 
in their interest rate and risk profile.   
• An underwriter assists the trust in selling the securities to investors.  Under 
federal securities laws, underwriters provide investors with a prospectus that 
provides detailed information regarding the issued securities, including their 
risks.  (Underwriting the securities is different than “underwriting” the 
mortgage loans.  The latter refers to the originator’s credit-analysis process 
in making the mortgage loans.) 
• Investors buy the securities in hopes of making a return on their investment 
over time as the loan payments are distributed.  Investors in “residential 
mortgage-backed securities,” or RMBS, typically are large, sophisticated 
investors, such as hedge funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and 
commercial banks.   
• A trustee acts as the agent on behalf of the various investors, whose identity 
changes whenever securities are traded in the market.  The trustee, usually a 
large financial institution, allocates payments to the investors according to 
the amounts and priority set forth in the PSA.  As in this case, the trustee 
(HSBC Bank USA, National Association) also acts on behalf of investors in 
the event of litigation.  
• A servicer acts on behalf of the trust to collect payments from the mortgage 
loans.  The servicer’s administrative duties include mailing billing 
statements, collecting payments, monitoring delinquent accounts, and 
engaging in debt workouts and foreclosure proceedings. 
Securitization produces many economic benefits for the parties involved: for 
originators, it provides access to capital and liquidity; for homeowners, it reduces 
the cost of borrowing (and thus the cost of owning a home); and for investors, it 
creates a simpler and more efficient way to assess risk.  In the broader economy, 
securitization supplies funding needed to finance capital-intensive investments, 
efficiently allocates risk to parties best able to assess and undertake the risk, and 
fosters home ownership.  
 10 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff’s position rests on three fundamental misconceptions of the market 
for mortgage-backed securities.  Those pertain, first, to the structure of a 
securitization transaction, which is designed to transfer the future risk on the 
underlying mortgage loans from the seller to the investors; second, to the appetite 
for risk and the concerns of investors who bought mortgage-backed securities; and 
third, to the ability of investors to detect breaches and pursue repurchase claims.  
These errors lead to Plaintiff’s mistaken conclusion that the statute of limitations 
does not bar a repurchase claim made at any point during the life of a loan—a 
position at odds with the text of the underlying contract and the understanding of 
the market.  
I. Securitization is designed to transfer the future risk on the underlying 
loans from the seller to the investors. 
Securitization transactions are designed to transfer the future risk on the 
assets being sold (in this case, mortgage loans) from the seller to the buyer (in this 
case, the depositor and thus ultimately the investors).  This removes the seller from 
any ongoing role with the mortgage loans.  Nonetheless, in light of its litigation 
interests, Plaintiff attempts to recast the seller as a crucial participant in the 
securitization throughout the life of these loans.  See, e.g., Plaintiff-Appellant Br. 
22 (referring to Defendant-DBSP’s “distinct and continuing obligation to cure or 
 11 
repurchase”).  That position is not only wrong but antithetical to the fundamental 
structure and aims of securitization.  
Securitization is a particular process designed to achieve particular goals.  If 
investors simply wished to invest in home-mortgage loans, there are of course 
familiar ways to do so: one could acquire the equity or debt of a company that 
made and collected on mortgage loans—such as a local bank that held its mortgage 
loans on its own balance sheet.  But investing in such a company exposes investors 
to a wide range of risks: even if its mortgage loans are paid in full, the company’s 
other lines of business may perform poorly, its management may be ineffectual, its 
accounting may not be transparent, or a local economic downturn may devalue the 
company’s other assets.   
Securitization, however, allows investors to make a targeted investment in 
only the home-mortgage loans.  Investor exposure is thereby isolated to a specific 
set of income-producing assets, not an entire operating company.  Moreover, 
because loans of differing types and locations can be selected for a given 
securitization, investors can custom tailor their investments to well-defined and 
well-diversified assets.  This simplifies the risk-assessment process for investors by 
limiting their exposure to risks associated with the company.  In other words, the 
risk of a company’s default or even bankruptcy need not drive an investor’s 
analysis; in a securitization, even if the originator or seller fails, investors will be 
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unaffected because their repayment comes from the loans sold to the depositor and 
held by the trust.
7
  This aspect of “bankruptcy remoteness”—an essential part of 
any securitization—is achieved only if the transfer of loans from the seller to the 
depositor is a “true sale.”
8
    
 Extending a seller’s obligation to cure or repurchase defective loans 
throughout the life of the securitization transaction would undermine this true-sale 
requirement, which is crucial to the structure and benefits of securitization.  
Investors, eager to avoid bankruptcy risks, of course demand that the true-sale 
requirement be satisfied, and they are not the only ones; credit-rating agencies also 
insist on a true sale before rating the securities as investment-grade.9  An 
obligation that makes a seller responsible for the risk of future performance on the 
underlying loans, throughout the life of the securitization transaction, would 
undermine the true sale, thereby jeopardizing the separation of the seller from the 
underlying financial asset.
10
  
                                           
7 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1543 (2004) 
(“Perhaps the most critical issue in a securitization is whether the [trust’s] investors will continue to be 
repaid in the event of the originator’s bankruptcy. If the [depositor/trust] owns the financial assets, its 
investors will continue to be repaid; if not, their right to be repaid will be suspended and subject to 
possible impairment.”). 
8 Id. (the depositor/trust—as opposed to the seller—“will own the financial assets only if the transfer 
of those assets from the originator to the [depositor] constitutes a sale under applicable bankruptcy law—
usually referred to as a ‘true sale.’”). 
9 Id. at 1545–46.  
10 See, e.g., STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET 
SECURITIZATION (3d ed) §4:2, at 4-6 (observing that the “most significant factor in the true sale 
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Plaintiff now seeks to shift the risk of future loan performance onto the 
seller.  It suggests that Defendant-DBSP, as seller, has a “continuing contractual 
obligation to cure or repurchase defective loans.”11  Plaintiff-Appellant Brief at 4.  
The “basic bargain,” Plaintiff asserts, was that the seller should “shoulder the 
burden of curing or repurchasing whenever a defective loan was discovered.”  Id. 
at 21 (emphasis in original).  And Plaintiff misleadingly claims that there exists a 
“crucial guarantee that [the seller], not the Trust or its investors, would bear 
responsibility for the life of the Agreements should any loans prove defective.”  Id. 
at 27.  But, as explained above, the seller’s role in the securitization effectively 
ends when it sells its loans to the depositor.  At that point, the seller either has or 
has not breached its representations and warranties as to the quality at that time of 
the sold loans; while investors may be able to seek remedies from the seller before 
the close of the statute of limitations, there is no further opportunity for a breach to 
occur.   
Plaintiff’s conception of the seller’s ongoing role is, to my knowledge, 
atypical of the industry view.  Sellers are not regarded as the perpetual guarantors 
Plaintiff makes them out to be.  To start, sellers are compensated in a manner 
typical of a one-time sale: they are paid a negotiated purchase price at the closing, 
                                                                                                                                        
determination appears to be the nature and extent of recourse that the transferee of the [loans] has against 
the transferor. As the degree of recourse increases, the likelihood that a court will find a true sale 
decreases.”). 
11 See also Plaintiff-Appellant Brief at 20 (arguing there is a “continuing obligation”).  
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after which the future risks associated with the sold mortgage loans are assumed by 
the buyer of those loans (the depositor in this case, and thus effectively the 
investors).  The only risk the seller retains is associated with its representations and 
warranties about the quality of the loans at the time they are sold.        
If the investors wanted protection against the risk of future performance of 
the mortgage loans, other parties and mechanisms—familiar to the industry—exist 
to fill that insurer-type role.  The primary protection against the risk of faulty and 
nonperforming loans, Plaintiff implies, is the seller’s repurchase obligation.  In 
reality, securitization transactions commonly feature several forms of “credit 
enhancement” that play a far more important role in limiting risk and ensuring 
payment.   
Credit enhancement refers to steps taken to improve the likelihood of full 
and timely payment of investors in securitization transactions.  It includes both the 
internal structuring of a transaction and external guarantees by third parties.  Three 
common forms of credit enhancement are illustrative.   
First, securities within a transaction vary in their risk level according to a 
“waterfall” structure.  The least risky “senior” tranche of securities has the first 
claim on mortgage-loan repayment proceeds, a second tranche receives payment 
only after the more senior securities are fully paid, and so on until the riskiest and 
most “junior” tranche is payable last.  If there is a shortfall in repayment proceeds, 
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the junior security holders may receive a reduced payout or nothing at all.  
Investors choose the tranche of securities in which they invest based on their 
appetite for risk (and the higher contractual rate of return associated with higher 
risk).   
Second, the interest rate on the sold mortgage loans often exceeds the 
interest rate on the securities whose payment is backed by those mortgage loans.  
As “excess interest” accrues on the mortgage loans, it adds to the 
“overcollateralization” of those securities by providing value marginally in excess 
of the amount needed to repay the securities.  Thus unexpected losses on some of 
the mortgage loans should not affect payouts to even the most junior security 
holders.   
Third, insurance companies often provide, in exchange for a premium 
payment, “monoline” or “bulk mortgage” insurance that, respectively, guarantees 
repayment of the securities or payment of a portion of the underlying mortgage 
loans that default.  These forms of insurance are the surest way by which investors 
typically limit the risk of future performance of the mortgage loans. Many of the 
securitization transactions currently in litigation include both of these forms of 
insurance.  
All of these mechanisms serve to spread, hedge, and insure against risk of 
nonpayment during the up-to-30-year time horizon of most residential mortgage-
 16 
backed investments.  And they explicitly and clearly account for that risk, in 
contrast to Plaintiff’s forced argument in this case that the seller should take on 
that risk through the blunt instrument of repurchase claims.   
II. Plaintiffs vastly overstate the importance of an enlarged limitations 
period to investors in mortgage-backed securities. 
Plaintiff asks this Court to impose a perpetual statute of limitations because, 
in Plaintiff’s view, “it is unthinkable that investors would have agreed to invest” in 
these securities without a repurchase obligation that lasted for the 30-year life of 
the loans.  Br. for Plaintiff-Appellant 27; see also, e.g., Reply Br. 10–11.  This 
continuing assurance that sellers would repurchase loans in breach at any point 
during the life of the loan was, according to Plaintiff, an “essential component of 
the basic risk-shifting bargain.”  Br. for Plaintiff-Appellant at 25.  Otherwise, 
“investors simply could not have taken on the risk” of mortgage-backed securities, 
id. at 1,12 and “there would have been no investors,” id. at 27.  This is a totally 
misleading and inaccurate characterization of the market for mortgage-backed 
securities in the mid-2000s. 
For the sophisticated institutions investing in mortgage-backed securities at 
that time, the window for filing repurchase claims was hardly a critical issue.  
Under New York’s generous statute of limitations, they had six years to bring a 
                                           
12 Cf. id. at 10 (arguing that “investors simply could not agree to purchase certificates without 
receiving some assurance that [the seller], not the investors, would bear the risk [of false representations 
and warranties] for the life of the Trust”).  
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claim.  Because the only contractual basis for such a claim was a breach of seller’s 
representations and warranties about the quality of the mortgage loans at the time 
they were sold, any consequences of such a breach would be expected to surface 
well within that six-year period.  Thus the value of an extended limitations period 
would be marginal at best. 
Investors paid much more attention to a given security’s interest rate (which 
compensated the investor for the time value of money and the future risk of 
nonpayment) and the credit rating (which purported to benchmark the risks of 
delayed payment or nonpayment).  The interest rate reflects and compensates for 
greater or lesser degrees of risk.  If investors were troubled by uncertainty 
regarding the statute of limitations for repurchase claims, market factors would 
have adjusted interest rates upward to compensate for that uncertainty.  There is no 
reason to presume (as Plaintiff does) that contemplation of a six-year limitations 
period would have simply dried up the pool of potential investors.  See Br. for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 27 (“[T]here would have been no investors.”).  
Moreover, rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s provide 
credit ratings for debt securities, including mortgage-backed securities.  A rating 
reflects the rating agency’s assessment of the likelihood of timely payment of 
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interest and return of principal to investors.13  The higher the rating, the lower the 
perceived credit risk associated with the securities in question.14  This information 
helps investors find securities that match their appetite for risk (and hence for 
returns on their investments).  The rating agencies follow explicit methodologies in 
deriving their ratings—reviewing, for example, the credit quality of the underlying 
mortgage loans, legal and regulatory risks, payment structure and cash flow 
mechanics, operational and administrative risks, and counterparty risk.15  Nothing 
suggests any risk associated with the limitations period would have affected, or 
was inappropriately excluded from, their rating analyses.  Certainly nothing 
supports Plaintiff’s insinuation that enforcing a six-year statute of limitations, 
running from the date of sale, would effectively transform desirable investment-
grade securities into junk securities that no investor would touch.16 In fact, 
mortgage-backed securities were viewed as highly attractive investments—in part 
                                           
13 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency 
Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. 
14 The highest rating on long-term debt securities is AAA, with ratings descending to AA, then to A, 
and then to BBB and below.  See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The 
Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1.  Ratings below BBB- are deemed non-investment grade 
(or “junk,” as in junk bonds), and indicate that full and timely repayment on the securities may be 
speculative.  See, e.g., Standard & Poor’s Credit Rating Definitions & FAQs, available at 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us#def_1. 
15 Standard & Poor’s, Principles-Based Rating Methodology for Global Structured Finance 
Securities (May 29, 2007).   
16 Moreover, the representations and warranties were provided by unrated sellers.  If the investors 
truly could not have taken on the risk of mortgage-backed securities without a lifetime “guaranty” from 
the seller, they logically would have required the seller to have an investment grade rating.  Investors did 
not require any minimum rating of the sellers. 
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because they were considered more transparent and less risky than other market 
options.  Many institutional investors purchased mortgage-backed securities to 
comply with guidelines meant to ensure relatively safe investment choices.  These 
guidelines often restricted investments to securities with a credit rating above a 
certain minimum threshold; they did not, to my knowledge, consider the length of 
the repurchase statute of limitations an important factor.  The risk of loss for senior 
securities was perceived to be quite low because the underlying loans were 
numerous and geographically diverse,  not because the period for bringing suit was 
unusually long.  
Thus it is historically inaccurate and analytically misleading to try to link the 
limitations period to investors’ willingness to buy mortgage-backed securities.  
Plaintiff points to no contemporaneous evidence of such a linkage, and in my 
experience I am unaware of any.  To the contrary, few if any investors or other 
observers at that time contemplated a cratering of the real-estate market that would 
spawn massive mortgage-loan defaults.  To the extent any investor might have 
considered a statute of limitations, it would have been vastly overshadowed by the 
interest rate and credit rating on the securities.  And it is important to recall that the 
question is not whether an investor (or trustee) had any repurchase remedy at all 
for a breach of its representations and warranties. The only question before the 
Court is whether they should have more than six years from the date of the 
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transactions to pursue that remedy.  Plaintiff, in short, grossly exaggerates the ex 
ante importance to securities investors of the length of the statute of limitations. 
III. Six years from a loan’s sale is ample time to bring a repurchase claim.  
Plaintiff complains that investors would lack “any meaningful protection” if 
they had to sue within six years of the date of sale.  Br. for Plaintiff-Appellant 29.  
Plaintiff similarly alleges that it “blinks reality” to contend that investors could 
discover breaches within six years of the closing, or that it would be commercially 
reasonable to expect them to do so.  Id.  Moreover, complying with a six-year 
limitation period, Plaintiff insists, would require “the exceedingly costly and time-
consuming burden of reunderwriting nearly 9,000 loans.”  Id. at 10.  These 
contentions are at odds with the reality for investors and trustees like those 
involved in this case.  
Plaintiff’s argument fails as a factual matter.  In the first place, numerous 
plaintiffs have been able to identify alleged breaches within six years of the loan 
sales.  Nothing suggests the plaintiffs in those cases were unusually swift or 
diligent in reviewing the relevant loans; they simply exercised their rights in the 
window ordinarily granted breach-of-contract plaintiffs in New York courts.  
Moreover, identifying a breach is not the needle-in-a-haystack endeavor that 
Plaintiff describes.  The simplest way is to use delinquent or defaulted loans as a 
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proxy for the possibility that there might have been a breach.
17
  Trustees and 
investors can identify these nonperforming loans simply by reviewing monthly 
reports compiled and issued by trustees, which identify, among other information, 
delinquencies and defaults on the underlying mortgage loans.  Seeing multiple 
delinquent or defaulted loans, especially soon after the closing, would alert the 
trustee and investors to investigate whether a breached representation-and-
warranty provision might have been the cause, and whether any problem extended 
beyond the loans already identified.      
Contrary to Plaintiff’s description, it is not necessary to re-underwrite each 
loan in the trust in order to determine whether there are wide-spread breaches of 
representations and warranties.  Reviewing a sampling of loans is one obvious way 
to detect any such widespread past breaches.  Regardless whether sampling 
satisfies relevant legal standards in court (a frequently and currently disputed 
question), it plainly would suffice to alert trustees and investors to the possibility 
that there might be widespread past breaches.  Nothing supports Plaintiff’s notion 
that immediate and comprehensive re-underwriting of all the loans is required or 
even appropriate.   
                                           
17 Delinquent or defaulted loans are not a perfect proxy for a breach because a breach of a 
representation and warranty might be benign—i.e., it does not impact ongoing timely payment of the 
loan. In that case, however, the parties would have  little incentive to pursue repurchase of that 
performing loan. 
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This is particularly true because as time passes between the closing of a 
securitization transaction and an underlying mortgage loan’s nonperformance, it 
becomes less and less likely that a breach of a representation and warranty about 
the quality of the loan at the time of the closing caused the loan’s later 
nonperformance.
18
  For loans that are timely repaid for years and only later stop 
performing, the nonperformance is much more likely caused by a change in the 
borrowers’ circumstances than by any original representation-and-warranty breach.  
Similarly, as time passes, litigation becomes a much more difficult and costly way 
to accurately determine liability for a past breach.  As with any case, evidence 
becomes less clear over time, and alternative explanations mount.  This is one of 
the fundamental policy reasons for a statute-of-limitations period.19  Thus, as a 
policy matter it makes perfect sense for the repurchase right to lapse after six years.    
IV. Sellers and investors reasonably understood New York’s statute of 
limitations to bar repurchase claims filed six years after the loan sale.  
The aforementioned errors underlie Plaintiff’s position that the cure-or-
repurchase remedy extends the limitations period in repurchase actions beyond six 
years from the closing.  The actual commercial context and realities, rather, show 
                                           
18 Cf. supra note 17 and accompanying text (explaining why loan nonperformance can be a proxy, 
albeit not a perfect proxy, for representation-and-warranty breach). 
19 This explanation is consistent with the amicus brief filed in the court below by Professor Miller, 
who discussed the statute-of-limitations policy against uncertain and costly litigation.  He argued that any 
attempt to determine, after more than six years, whether representations and warranties were correct on 
the closing date would be “difficult and could destroy[] value rather than create it.” Miller Br. at 22–23. 
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that six years from the closing date is an appropriate limit that comports with the 
nature of securitization transactions.   
The text and structure of the relevant remedy provisions confirm this 
conclusion.  Those provisions have been thoroughly explicated by the parties and 
other amici.  This brief will not add to that analysis, other than to observe that 
nothing in the contractual provisions at issue, or in similar provisions in other 
securitization transactions, indicates any intent to remove these transactions from 
New York’s default statute of limitations.   
The cure-or-repurchase provision plainly governs how, not when, investors 
may recover.  Likewise, the sole-remedy provision underscores that the contract 
limits, rather than expands, the recourse available to Plaintiff.  And the no-action 
and notice provisions provide procedural protections that Plaintiff must follow in 
bringing a claim.  All of these provisions set forth the remedy for a breach of 
representations and warranties, not an independent duty or condition precedent that 
triggers the limitations period in the first place.  Because these MLPA provisions 
do not address (and therefore do not disturb) the time within which a repurchase 
claim may be made, New York’s default limitations period applies. 
Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion of an “independent” obligation, see 
Plaintiff-Appellant Br. 11, these remedial provisions are derivative, substantively 
and temporally, of the seller’s contractual promise to sell loans that, at the time of 
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their sale, comported with the seller’s representations and warranties of quality.  
Any repurchase obligation flowed from a representation-and-warranty breach by 
the seller that must have occurred (if at all) on the date of closing.  It is clear from 
Section 7(a) of the MLPA that the repurchase obligation applies to “a breach of 
any of the representations and warranties contained in Section 6” of the MLPA, 
which states that Defendant-DBSP’s representations and warranties are made 
solely “as of the Closing Date.”  Defendant-DBSP thus has no obligation regarding 
loans that, for any reason other than a representation-and-warranty breach on the 
closing date, later become defective. This is a critical point that is continuously 
obfuscated in Plaintiff’s brief.  See, e.g., Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant Brief 21 
(arguing that the “basic bargain” was that Defendant-DBSP should “shoulder the 
burden of curing or repurchasing whenever a defective loan was discovered”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 Experienced industry practitioners have never, to my knowledge, conceived 
of these provisions in the way Plaintiff imagines.  And that’s for good reason.  An 
unbounded statute of limitations would undermine the goals of the parties in the 
manner described above, and would disserve consumers and the economy more 
generally.  As noted, the benefits of securitization—reduced cost of capital, lower 
interest rates, enhanced liquidity, more efficient risk allocation—depend on the 
certainty that the steps in the securitization process effectuate a true sale of the 
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mortgage loans.  Adoption of Plaintiff’s position would seriously jeopardize that 
sale, in this and many other similar deals.  This would be an unfortunate 
development for reasons beyond any effect on the national economy.  
Undermining the limitations period under New York contract law in this respect 
could threaten New York’s status as the jurisdiction of choice for the world’s 
capital-markets transactions.  An erosion of the contractual certainty that makes 
New York law so attractive would have obvious negative consequences for the 
state and its economy.   
Plaintiff argues that Defendant-DBSP’s position poses a threat “to the future 
of the [mortgage-backed securities] industry” because private capital will not be 
attracted unless courts enforce “the allocation of risk in the contracts as written.”  
Id. at 45.  To the contrary, that position is precisely consistent with the contractual 
obligations.  Therefore, the Court would preserve commercial expectations by 
agreeing with that position and affirming the decision below.   
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CONCLUSION 
 For these reasons, the decision of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. 
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